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The Chief Justice of the United States: More
than Just the Highest Ranking Judge
Alan B. Morrison and D. Scott Stenhouse*
The Chief Justice has always been more than first among
equals. His position as chair of the Supreme Court's weekly conferences, at which tentative votes are taken on cases that have
been argued, and decisions made on which cases will have full
briefing and argument, is more than titular. His power to choose
who will write the majority opinion, if he is on that side, can influence the course of the law, which depends at least as much on the
rationale as on the result. And his symbolic function as the leader
of our entire judicial system has always been important.
Such differences between his role and that of the other Justices are traditional and probably necessary. This article is about
a more recent and more disturbing phenomenon: the plethora of
nonjudicial responsibilities that modern Chief Justices have assumed or, more often, been assigned by Congress. Every Justice,
and indeed every federal judge, has some administrative duties.
But the Chief Justice has more of them, and on the whole his are
more significant. Cumulatively, his responsibilities raise several
serious questions.
The first is time. With increasing outside duties and an increasing caseload, is it possible for one person to continue to handle all of these tasks effectively? Or will nonjudicial activities
detract from the Court's primary function?
As a result of these activities, there has also been a significant
increase of the power of the Chief Justice. Some of his prerogatives are merely managerial. But many, such as the power to appoint important committees and to act as spokesman for the
federal judiciary, entail significant policy-making functions.
Should we be concerned about such concentrations of power in
one individual? No Chief Justice has been accused of any scandalous improprieties. But scandal is not the only danger inherent
• Mr. Morrison, a Washington attorney. directs the Public Citizen Litigation
Group. which he founded with Ralph Nader in 1972. The basic research for this anicle
was done by Mr. Stenhouse, who now practices law in Atlanta. while he was a student and
Mr. Morrison was a Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School.
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in extra-judicial endeavors. The administrative work of every
Chief Justice inevitably brings him or her into situations that
could tarnish the image of the Court, to the point where it is seen
as simply another participant in political disputes. If that were to
occur, it might do serious damage to the confidence most Americans have in the fundamental fairness of our court of last resort.
A final reason for studying the Chief Justice's duties is to
broaden our conception of the qualities that should be sought in
those who are considered for the office. What does the job
involve?
I.

TIME COMMITMENTS

"If the burdens of the office continue to increase as they have
in the past years, it may be impossible for the occupant to perform
all of the duties well and survive very long." Those words were
spoken by Chief Justice Burger in December, 1978.1 Nearly ten
years earlier, however, he endorsed the idea of judges serving on
the boards of nonprofit groups "so long as the demands on their
time and energy do not violate the absolute priority of their court
duties."2
Are those statements consistent, and if so, where is the problem? To begin, most of the Chief Justice's nonjudicial duties have
been imposed by Congress. Has this occurred too often? One
standard by which to answer that question was supplied by Senator Ervin, who declared that a judge's first responsibility is to "be
a full-time judge in his own court."3 The most time-consuming
obligation of the Chief Justice, apart from judging, is his role as
head of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which is, in
essence, the policy-making body of the federal judiciary. It is
comprised of the chief judges of all federal courts of appeals and a
district judge from each of the circuits (other than the new Federal
Circuit).4 The Conference is charged with supervision of the federal court system-trying to assure that cases are promptly decided, recommending rules changes, initiating or responding to
legislation relating to virtually every aspect of what transpires in
1. Address to the Conference on the Role of the Judiciary in America, December 14.
1978. The speech has never been printed. The quotation is from page 19 of a transcript
made from a tape recording prepared by the Institute [hereinafter cited as AEI Speech).
2. Nonjudicial Activilies of Supreme Courl Justices and Olher Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separalion of Powers of I he Senale Comm. on I he Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1969) (statement of Tom C. Clark, Director of the Federal Judicial Center) [hereinafter cited as Senale Hearings].
3. !d at 156.
4. 28 us.c. § 331 (1976).
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the federal courts, and the like.s When it was created by Congress
in 1922, the Conference met for one day each year. Now it has
two two-day meetings, and according to the Chief Justice each cf
these requires an additional two or three days for preparation.6
Besides serving as presiding officer, the Chief Justice appoints
the chairmen of over twenty committees,? dealing with subjects
like court administration, the jury system, probation, and federal
magistrates. Among the most important are those which consider
possible changes in procedural rules. The Conference's committees on judicial conduct advise judges about the propriety of various activities, review their reports of extra-judicial income, and
assist them with their financial disclosure forms required by the
Ethics in Government Act. The Chief Justice also appoints the
principal staff on several of these committees. Because of the key
role played by the committees, he keeps in close touch with their
chairs. In 1972, Congress authorized the appointment of an Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice, in part to relieve him of
some of the liaison functions with groups such as the Judicial
Conference.s But as Chief Justice Burger himself recognized,
"there is a limit to the delegation of functions and a limit in delegating decisionmaking."9
A second major responsibility is his position as chair of the
Board of the Federal Judicial Center.Io Congress has directed
that he, the six sitting federal judges, and the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, who comprise the
Center's Board, meet quarterly to oversee its work. II The Center,
whose primary function is to engage in research, training, and education for the judicial branch,I2 has a budget which has increased from $500,000 at its inception in 1967 to almost $8,600,000
today.B It engages in a wide range of research projects, offers
5. Jd
6. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 20-21.
7. P. fiSH, THE POLITICS OF fEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 269 (1973). 1982
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ivvi lists nineteen that reported at that meeting, plus a number of subcommittees, the principal ones being those on rules of practice. Apparently, there is no published up-to-date list
of the Conference's committees.
8. Pub. L. No. 92-238, 86 Stat. 406 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 677 (1976)).
9. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 25.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 62l(a)(l) (1976).
II. 28 U.S.C. §§ 621, 622 (1976).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1976). The Center also issues an annual report which is helpful
in understanding its functions and operations and provides the basis for the description
which follows.
13. Hearings on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judician• and
Related Agencies Appropriations, for 1983 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, ·State,
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training sessions for judges and nonjudicial personnel in the system, and has committees on such topics as prisoners' civil rights
suits, revising jury instructions, and conducting conferences for
appellate judges. Like the committees of the Judicial Conference,
those working under the Federal Judicial Center also require the
time and attention of the Chief Justice.
A third duty concerns the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts. This Office works closely with the Federal Judicial
Center and the Judicial Conference in the broad area of judicial
administration. It is almost impossible to assign many of the
Chief Justice's duties to any one of the three because there is so
much overlap. His specific responsibilities for the Administrative
Office arise because its director and deputy are appointed by the
Supreme Court and their work is under the direction of the Judicial Conference.'4 Since courts or conferences cannot, as a practical matter, supervise individuals, much of the responsibility falls
on the Chief Justice.
A great deal of what the Administrative Office does, such as
handling pay and purchasing books and other supplies,'s is generally no burden to the Chief Justice. But the Office is also the major source of data for the Judicial Conference and the Congress
about the use of the federal courts. These, in turn, are vital to the
Chief because of his concerns about the increasing case load, the
adequacy of judicial salaries, and the number of judges. For these
reasons he has become involved, although probably to a lesser degree than in other areas of court administration, in the work of the
Administrative Office.
Another major responsibility is what he has referred to somewhat facetiously as his "role of building manager of the Supreme
Court building."'6 Of course, the day to day operations are handled by the marshall, clerk, librarian, reporter of decisions, and
the Chiefs administrative assistant.' 7 They in turn are subject to
the supervision of the whole Court. In some cases this is done by
Court committees; in others the job has fallen to individual Justices, particularly the Chief Justice.
Chief Justice Burger has taken his duties in managing the
Supreme Court building very seriously. He himself has menThe Judiciary of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong.. 2d Sess. 321 (1982) (statement of A. Leo Levin, Director, Federal Judicial Center).
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604(a) (1976).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1976). The Administrative Office also publishes annual reports
that set forth its functions and operations.
16. AEI Speech. supra note I, at 24.
17. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 671-677 (1976).
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tioned the time that he spends in making decisions relating to the
modernization of the Court's equipment.ts Other observers have
mentioned his involvement in such details as ordering painL,
planting flowers, having the reflecting pools painted blue, and installing exhibits for tourists.t9 He has also changed the lighting of
the courtroom, altered the shape of the Justices' bench, moved the
journalists' location, and improved the cafeteria. Indeed, he is so
well versed in the Court's budget that he was able to recite down
to the last dollar the overtime charges that were being run up in
the print shop in trying to have all the opinions ready for Monday
morning before the practice was changed in the mid-1960s.2o
Congress has also required the Chief Justice to make various
kinds of appointments. Many involve temporary or special purpose courts such as the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals,2t which in recent years has concentrated on energy price
litigation, and the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation,22
which coordinates complex cases arising in various locations
around the country.23 He is also empowered to assign judges
within the federal system to fill temporary needs-with their consent and that of their chief judge-including trips to such places as
the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.2 4
These assignments do not comprise a significant portion of his
work load, but they are one more straw on the camel's back.
Equally important, they may permit the Chief to exercise extraordinary influence in certain areas of the law.
Congress has assigned to the Chief Justice many activities
which are remote from judicial administration. In 1846 it made
him a Regent of the Smithsonian2s and more recently a trustee of
the National Gallery of Art and the Joseph M. Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden.26 Other outside positions, not con18. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 24.
19. Oster, Burger: High Court Politician, Chicago Sun Times, Dec. 4, 1977, p. 4.
20. Interview with Carl Stem, NBC Washington Correspondent (April II, 1979).
The significance of the episode is in the fact that the Chief Justice considered such an
administrative detail to be of sufficient importance to be worth his time to investigate,
presumably in order to prevent similar problems from arising in the future.
21. Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 2ll(b)(l). 85 Stat. 743, 749 (1971) (set out as a note in 12
U.S.C. § 1904 (1976)).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
23. According to Chief Justice Burger, he and his predecessor have made more than
fifty appointments under these and similar provisions. Burger, Annual Report on the State
ofthe Judiciary at the midyear meeting of the American Bar Association. Feb. 6, 1983 at II
[hereinafter cited as 1983 ABA Speech].
24. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1694(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981); 48 U.S.C. § 1614(a) (1976).
25. Act of Aug. 10, 1846, ch. 178, § 3, 9 Stat. 102, 103 (1846) (current version at 20
U.S.C. § 42 (1976)).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 76cc(b) (1976).
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gressionally imposed, include: Honorary Chairman of the Board
of Trustees of the Supreme Court Historical Society (a group
formed at his urging); Honorary Trustee of the National Geographic Society; and Honorary Chairman of the Institute on Judicial Administration and the National Judicial College.27 Some of
these are pleasant diversions, yet they can become demanding. It
is worth recalling that Chief Justice William Howard Taft resigned from the Board of Yale University because he felt the ten
meetings a year did not permit him to maintain his work load on
the Court.2s
There is a great deal that the Chief Justice has to do simply
because he is the Chief Justice-the inevitable swearings-in, receptions, and attendance at joint sessions of Congress addressed
by the president.29 While every other Justice is assigned to one
federal judicial circuit for administrative and other duties, the
Chief and two other Justices are assigned an additional circuit.Jo
Each year the circuit holds a conference which its Justice usually
attends and often addresses. The Chief Justice also makes an annual address on the state of the judiciary to the American Bar
Association, and frequently speaks before the American Law Institute, law schools, and other gatherings.
How much time does all this take? By one report, the Chief
Justice has timed his own work week at seventy-seven hours, with
about one-third devoted to non-case activities.3I He has also
stated that no member of the Court works less than sixty hours a
week.32 Surely, by any measure, his work load is considerable,
and the burdens from his non-case activities are significant.
Some perspective can be gained by considering his extra-judicial duties in light of the Court's case load. For example, during
the 1953 Term (Earl Warren's first) the Court issued sixty-five
signed opinions; in the 1981-82 Term that figure was 141, or more
than double the number thirty years before; in the same period,
the number of cases on the Court's docket went from 1463 to
5311.33
Have outside activities prevented the Chief Justice from writ27. WHo's WHO IN AMERICA 453 (42d ed. 1982-83).
28. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 141 (statement of Alexander M. Bickel).
29. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 24.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 42. A listing of current assignments appears at 457 U.S. ii (1982).
31. Oster, supra note 19, at 4.
32. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 26. See also 1983 ABA Speech, supra note 23, at 9,
in which the Chief Justice stated that the Court's work load presents "a very grave problem
and something must be done."
33. 1983 ABA Speech, supra note 23, at I. While different measures might produce
different percentage increases, and while numbers alone are not the sole measure of the

1984]

U.S. CHIEF JUSTICE

63

ing a reasonable share of the Court's opinions? During the five
terms ending in June, 1982, he averaged the same number of majority opinions as his colleagues. Yet he wrote far fewer concurrences and dissents than any other Justice, perhaps partly because
he cast relatively few dissenting votes. This may reflect a conviction that, as Chief Justice, he should try to harmonize the Court's
work and that therefore concurrences and dissents should be used
sparingly.34 But there is at least some evidence that in a few cases
each year there is not enough time for the Chief to add his concurring or dissenting views, and so he joins others rather than separately stating his own position.Js
Can a Chief Justice, despite considerable nonjudicial work,
devote adequate thought to judging? Charles Evans Hughes and
Joseph R. Lamar, who served on presidential commissions while
they were Associate Justices, were reportedly unable to maintain
their full judicial work loads.36 Indeed, Hughes acknowledged
that he was so worn out by the added burdens that his work was
impaired for several months even after the commission was concluded. This was during an era when the Court's case load was
relatively light. Chief Justice Burger says that the Court should
give full treatment to no more than 100 cases each year if it is to
maintain adequate quality.37 The current level, including full per
curiam opinions, is more than fifty percent beyond this figure.
Some of a Chiefs activities will inevitably reflect personal interests. The incumbent, for instance, cares intensely about judicial
administration. But most of his duties are mandatory and, since
his successor will probably have some favorite causes, the work
load of non-case activities is not likely to decrease substantially.
As Chief Justice Burger put it, just "because the Chief Justices, up
to now, have somehow managed to cope, we should not assume
that these glacial pressures can always be kept under control."Js
Court's work load, no one doubts that there has been a significant increase in the demands
on the Court's time.
34. In the 1981-82 Term, the Chief Justice continued to have a below average ntmber
of concurring and dissenting opinions, but his dissenting votes cast (opinions written plus
those he joined) equalled the numerical average for all nine Justices.
35. Linda Greenhouse, who covers the Court for the New York Times, attempted to
find the Chief Justice's mark on the 1981 Term, but found his role was decidedly secondary, particularly with regard to the Court's most important decisions. N.Y. Times, July
20, 1982, p. A20, col. I. But in the most recent term he wrote the opinions in two of the
most significant cases, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983)
and Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
36. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 139 (statement of Alexander M. Bickel).
37. AEI Speech, supra note 2, at 13; 1983 ABA Speech, supra note 23, at 7-8, 12.
38. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 29.
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POLITICAL POWER

It would be hard to find an educated American who does not
realize that in making constitutional law the Supreme Court
wields a significant kind of political power. The nonjudicial political powers of the Chief Justice are less well appreciated. Congress has assigned him a major role in three significant policymaking fields: creating rules for the federal courts, participating
in the legislative process, and appointing judges to certain special
courts.
The role of judges-and particular Supreme Court Justicesin fashioning or approving procedures derives from the commonsense notion that they are uniquely qualified for this task. In 1934
Congress gave the Court the job of writing federal rules of civil
procedure, subject only to the right of Congress to override them
by statute.J9 Since then Congress has also given the Court responsibility for the criminal, appellate, and bankruptcy rules, andsubject to a veto by either house of Congress-the rules of evidence (except those relating to the law of privilege).4o
As every attorney knows, procedural rules sometimes determine cases. Indeed, when the Court sent over its Rules of Evidence in 1972, they created such a controversy that Congress
substantially rewrote them.4t
Two examples will give a sense of the significance of some
procedural rules. The class action enables the aggregation of
small claims that could not economically be brought individually.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that in cases principally seeking money damages the complainant must notify each
class member of the case by the best means available, so that each
may decide whether to join the case or proceed separately. 42 This
rule makes sense if each person has a significant sum of money at
stake, say $1,000 or more. But when each claim is only fifteen
dollars, and there are three million members of the class, the rule
makes class actions impossible, especially since the plaintiff must
39. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)). See generally Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of1934, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1015 ( 1982).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) (appellate); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (1976) (bankruptcy); and 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976) (evidence). It is now clear that the
veto over rules of evidence is void, I=igration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 103 S.
Ct. 2764 (1983). but perhaps this veto will be deemed severable from the grant of rulemaking authority.
41. For a discussion of the legislative history of this congressional intervention in the
rule-making process, see 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051.
42. fED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2).

1984]

US. CHIEF JUSTICE

65

pay the cost of the individual notice.43 The Court could easily
change the rule, and thereby encourage class actions, but it has
chosen not to do so.44
Or consider discovery. In civil cases, the discovery rules are
quite liberal, which helps the claimant when the evidence is
largely in the possession of the other side, as often occurs in complex antitrust and securities fraud litigation. Sometimes these
rules have an opposite effect, enabling a wealthy defendant to
overwhelm a small opponent with extensive and time-consuming
discovery, forcing a cheap settlement. Clearly, any change in discovery rules will alter the results of some cases.
In theory, the power of the Chief Justice, as one of nine Justices who vote on all rule changes, is no greater than that of his
colleagues. In fact, that is not the way the system works. Of necessity, the Justices give proposed rules only a cursory glance.
This reality elevates the importance of the drafters. Rules proposals come from the Judicial Conference, headed by the Chief Justice, after passing through the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and the appropriate advisory committee,
whose members are his appointees.45 In addition, the staff person
who does the basic research for the advisory committee (known as
the reporter) is selected by the Chief Justice. Since most potential
reporters are academics, their views are often readily ascertainable, making it possible to ensure that appointees concentrate on
areas of importance to the Chief and rarely suggest rule changes
that are inconsistent with his philosophy. While the committee
system is not simply an extension of the Chief Justice's personal
staff, there is a close connection between them not readily apparent from the formal structure established by Congress. At the
very least it provides a substantial protection against unfriendly
rule changes reaching the Supreme Court where they would have
to be formally voted down to be defeated.46
One recent addition to the Chief Justice's powers in the rule43. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974).
44. It should be noted that the 1966 amendments to the class action rules were intended to increase the availability of class actions in the federal courts. The point is not
that one approach or the other is preferable, but that the Court's ~wer to make such
significant changes embodies a major policy-making component.
45. For a summary of the actual operation of the rule-making process for the federal
couns. see Hearings on Rulemaking Oversight Bifore the Subcomm. on Courts. Civil Liberues, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciar)', 98th Cong .. 1st
Sess. (1983) (statement of Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure).
46. The Court has notified Congress that it would "see no reason to oppose legislation
to eliminate this court from the rulemaking process." Legal Times of Wash., May 22. 1983
p. 2, col. I.
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making process deserves special mention. In the Classified Information Procedures Act of 198{)47 Congress sought a solution to the
problem of what to do with classified materials that become part
of court proceedings, as well as the problem of "graymail"-the
threat by a defendant in a criminal case to use classified information to defend himself. The job of writing the security procedures
was given jointly to the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, the
Director of the CIA, and the Secretary of Defense.4s Aside from
any problems that may arise if the Supreme Court ever has to
decide the validity of those rules, the notion that the Chief Justice
and members of the Executive Branch should jointly issue regulations of this kind contradicts the basic tenets of separation of powers. Not only is the Chief Justice's role undesirable, it is also
plainly unnecessary.
Another major source of the Chiefs political power is his
ability to influence legislation. The formal power to propose or
evaluate bills resides in the Judicial Conference, not the Court or
the Chief Justice. The Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts also play a role through
their research and the statistics they provide, which are often used
by the Chief Justice in his speeches to support or oppose a given
recommendation. Their evidence is especially influential in congressional decisions about the number of federal judges and support personnel and, less directly, on whether new kinds of cases
should be allowed in the federal courts in light of the current case
load. In addition, the Judicial Center's research "often involves
matters that are subjects of legislative consideration-for example,
criminal code revision, the Speedy Trial Act, or proposals to
restructure judges' sentencing discretion . . . ."49
Congress undoubtedly needs assistance when it writes legislation that affects the courts. Chief Justice Burger believes it is "absolutely necessary" for judges to provide this assistance.so Yet
there are others who, at least collectively, are equally well qualified to do so, without tarnishing the appearance of judicial neutrality. Indeed, it is largely because judges seem to be neutral that
when the Judicial Conference proposes a statute, or comments on
one suggested by others, its views are treated with unusual respect.
No doubt the Conference's long-standing opposition to al47. 18 U.S C. App. §§ 1-16 (Supp. V 1981).
48. 18 U.SC. App. § 9(a) (Supp. V 1981).
49. fEDER.'\L JUDICIAL CENTER, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1981).
50. The remarks were made at a speech at Fordham University several weeks after
Congressional passage of the Bankruptcy Act in 1978, and are quoted in The Third
Branch, Nov. 1978. p. 3, col. 2.
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lowing veterans to bring suits to challenge denials of benefits 51 is
partly responsible for the failure of that proposal to be adopted.
Similarly, the negative views of the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee On Judicial Review Provisions In Regulatory Reform Legislation may well have been responsible for modifying proposals
for greater judicial scrutiny of decisions of administrative
agencies.s2
The influence of the Chief Justice himself on legislation may
in some senses be more powerful than in rule making, even
though the Conference can only make recommendations. Unlike
rule making, in which every Justice has a vote, none of the remaining eight has a legislative role since the views are expressed
by the Judicial Conference, not the Court. Some of the Conference's legislative recommendations come from standing committees over which the Chief Justice has the considerable powers
described above; in other cases special committees are formed,
where the Chiefs decision to create a new group may be the single
most important aspect of the process.
It is impossible to assess fully the Chief Justice's impact on
legislation because his influence is often subtle. Perhaps more important, his role is unclear because the meetings of the committees, as well as of the Judicial Conference itself, are conducted
behind closed doors-a prerogative the Conference fought hard to
maintain in 1980 when Senator Dennis DeConcini proposed to
open virtually all of them to the public.s3
Appointments are the third major source of the Chief Justice's political power. In addition to appointing committees and
top staff for the Judicial Conference and the Judicial Center, he is
authorized to select, from the federal judiciary, the chief judge
and the members of several special courts. One of these courtsthe Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals-is now responsible
for appeals in all oil and gas pricing and allocation cases.s4 Obviously, his choice of these judges can have a major impact on the
development of the law. While no one has suggested that the
Chief Justice has unfairly balanced TECA, the possibility nonetheless exists and warrants serious thought.
51. See, e.g., 1981 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 65-66.
52. ld at 60-61. None of the proposals has yet become law.
53. See Letter from William E. Foley. Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Couns, to Senator Dennis DeConcini (June 18, 1980) opposing S. 2045, the
Judicial Conference in the Sunshine Act. See also Nelson, Secretive Judicial Conference
Could Open Its Drapes, Legal Times of Wash., March 15. 1982, p. 9. col. I.
54. See text accompanying note 21 supra; 17 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4105 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
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Another extremely important power that Congress has given
the Chief Justice is the right to name the members of the trial and
appellate benches of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
created by Congress to oversee the use of wiretaps by the executive branch in the foreign intelligence area.ss Most of the original
appointees were judges with reputations for upholding the government's position in criminal cases; in 1981 they lived up to their
reputations by approving all 431 Justice Department requests to
start or continue electronic surveillance.s6 Unlike the President's
judicial appointments, these designations by the Chief Justice are
not subject to Senate confirmation. While no one expected the
present Chief Justice to fill the positions only with civil libertarians, it surely would be more consistent with stated congressional
intentions to ensure better balance, perhaps by requiring that the
assignments be approved by the Supreme Court as a whole.
In suggesting that the Chief Justice has political power, it is
important not to overstate the case. He obviously does not possess
non-judicial power comparable to that of, say, a leader of Congress. But he has enough influence to justify a reevaluation of this
aspect of the office.
Ill.

MAINTAINING THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPARTIALITY

The Supreme Court has been called the "least dangerous
branch" because it lacks the two great powers of the sword and
the purse.s7 Its power ultimately rests on public support. That in
tum requires a popular belief that it is an impartial tribunal.
At least some of the Chief Justice's activities are potentially
damaging to this aura of impartiality. One of the themes echoed
by almost every witness at the 1969 Senate hearings on non-judicial activities of federal judges was that judges ought to stay out of
controversial matters.ss As Senator Ervin said, "There seems to
be widespread agreement with Chief Justices Hughes' statement
that the business of judges is 'to hear appeals and not to make
55. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. V. 1981).
56. US. Balling a Thousand, Nat. L.J., May 17, 1982, p. 9, col. 2.
57. See general/r A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
58. Some, but by no means all, of the support for this position may have been due to
the influence of the disclosures concerning Justices Fortas and Douglas on the witnesses. It
was in response to such concerns that Justice Brandeis was thought to have disentangled
himself from the outside world, even to the point of refusing to accept honorary degrees so
as not to be beholden to any institution. Senate Hearings. supra note 2. at 142. But see B.
MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS-fRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF Two SUPREME CoURT JUSTICES (1980).
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them.' "s9
The witnesses were aware of the contrary history, beginning
with John Jay, who served as secretary of state, ambassador to
Great Britain, and candidate for governor of New York, all while
he was sitting as our first Chief Justice.60 A number of other Justices also served on non-judicial bodies, such as the postal investigation commission (Chief Justice Hughes) and the group, headed
by Justice Lamar, that attempted to mediate the boundary dispute
between Venezuela and British Guiana.61 In the period around
World War II Justice Reed became chairman of the Committee to
Improve the Civil Service, Justice Roberts investigated Pearl Harbor, and Justice Jackson took a year's leave to serve as the American prosecutor at Nuremburg. The most famous recent example
of extra-judicial service was when Chief Justice Warren chaired
the committee investigating the assassination of President
Kennedy.62
Several witnesses at the Ervin committee hearings questioned
the propriety of such activities, although some admitted that there
might be a few reasonable exceptions. Professor Alexander Bickel
put it this way:
The Court necessarily begets quite a sufficient amount of controversy in the discharge of its office, and scarcely needs the additional controversy that a Justice
draws to himself, and hence to it, by gratuitously identifying himself with one or
another side of extraneous issues. There is, in other words, a drain not only on
the Justice's energies, but on his prestige, on his reservoir of public trust and
goodwill. He owes both his energies and his prestige to the Court, and should not
dissipate these assets elsewhere. 63

Judge Ralph Winter, then a law professor, expressed another objection to service on presidential commissions:
[W]hen a Justice takes such a position, he is in a sense committing a kind of fraud
on the American people, in that the purpose of his appointment is to trade on the
prestige of the Court and to endow the conclusions that the commission comes to
with that prestige and make it seem as though there has been a real judicial process involved . . . . 64

Whatever short-term benefit may have accrued as a result of
Chief Justice Warren's service in the investigation of the Kennedy
assassination seems to be outweighed by the doubts that have
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Senare Hearings, supra note 2, at 32.
fd
fd
fd
Jd
Jd

at 31-32.
at31.
at31.
at 140.
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arisen about that investigation. In his memoirs Warren recalled
his initial reservations about serving: it would be inconsistent
with the principle of separation of powers; it would take time
away from his work on the Court; it might cause him to disqualify
himself from litigation arising out of the investigation. Yet he
took the job, and his memoirs reflect no sense that this was an
unwise decision.65 Justice Roberts, in contrast, confessed that he
had made a mistake in accepting outside appointments while on
the Court.66 In retrospect it seems that none of these assignments
of sitting Justices to presidential commissions turned out well,
either for the work of their commissions or for the Court.
Today no active Justice sits on an investigative commission.
However, the Chief Justice has become involved in several other
endeavors that raise similar questions. For example, in Congress
the Judicial Conference and hence the Chief Justice speak for the
federal judiciary. There are three dangers whenever a judge takes
a legislative position on a controversial question: it may detract
from his or her real or apparent impartiality in a subsequent case;
the judge may be unable to limit himself to technical advice and
thus become a special interest pleader like every other lobbyist;
and, finally, it is hard to say what kinds of legislation are proper
subjects of comment by the Justices.
Two examples will illustrate the impartiality problem. Chief
Justice Burger, trying to reduce the judicial work load, has actively supported several different measures by which the types of
cases heard in the federal courts would be reduced. He has also
expressed doubt about the ability of juries to handle complex civil
cases. Those issues may well come before the Court in lawsuits
seeking to determine what is permitted under current law. In such
cases, the party whose position is not in conformity with the Chief
Justice's legislative aims may well feel that he is not receiving a
fair and impartial interpretation of the law as it now stands.
Professor Bickel warned that even speeches and articles by
judges endanger their basic role. His comments are even more apt
in the context of judicial lobbying:
If he goes on public record concerning issues that are likely to come before him in
his judicial capacity, he thereby at least appears to close his mind, to make himself less reachable by reasoned briefs and arguments. And in some measure every
man who goes on record in this fashion does in fact close his mind. Nothing is
more persuasive to ourselves than our own published prose.6 7
65. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL
66. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 205.
67. 1d at 142.
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Judges, like the rest of us, hold views on a wide range of topics,
many of which are not likely to be changed, no matter how eloquent the argument. But whatever chance exists surely becomes
considerably smaller when those views are set in print. And ultimately the question of whether judges should write and speak
about controversial subjects does not tum on whether they will
acquire closed minds, but rather on whether some litigants might
reasonably believe so.
This problem goes back at least as far as Chief Justice Taft,
who engaged in many efforts to improve the judicial system
through legislation.6s More recently, in 1967-68 Congress was
considering legislation to control wiretapping by government officials. The Judicial Conference, then led by Earl Warren, transmitted its views on the proposals at the same time that the Court
was deliberating on some of the same issues. As one scholar observed: "Judges in their administrative capacity were speaking authoritatively on subjects which might later come before them in
their judicial capacity. Although it is the judicial decision which
is final, the latter may in fact determine the former, whether the
subject matter relates to rules of procedure or substantial constitutional questions. "69
Successful legislative campaigns rarely are limited to gathering information on the status of pending bills, submitting comments for the record, and offering to answer questions. To be
effective, one usually must engage in less passive forms of persuasion. This means more than testifying at congressional hearings.
That is undoubtedly one reason why the Chief Justice discusses
his legislative agenda in speeches before bar associations and
other groups; he hopes, no doubt, that the remarks will be picked
up by the media.
Chief Justice Burger has twice been the center of the kind of
controversy that is likely to recur when judges engage in lobbying.
In one incident, he was reported to have sent Roland Kirks, then
director of the Administrative Office, in the company of an influential Washington lawyer-lobbyist, to visit House Speaker Albert
to campaign against some aspects of pending consumer legislationJo Kirks subsequently denied that the Chief Justice even
knew about the lobbying trip until after it occurred, yet the Chief
felt constrained to issue his own statement, which did not actually
68. See, e.g., R. WHEELER & H. WHITCOMB, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 30 (1977)
for Chief Justice Taft's role in creating the Judicial Conference.
69. P. FtsH, supra note 7, at 243.
70. Wash. Post, Oct. 3. 1978, p. Cll, col. 6.
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deny that he had sent Kirks, although he subsequently took that
position.?! It matters little who actually authorized whom to do
what. What is significant is that the Chief Justice was so personally involved in the lobbying process that he had to defend his
actions in the public press.
He also became very much involved with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, making extensive eleventh hour efforts to delay
the bill, including telephone calls to its sponsors and to highly
placed persons on the Senate Judiciary Committee.n One of the
bill's Senate supporters received a call from the Chief Justice in
which Burger reportedly "not only lobbied, but pressured and attempted to be intimidating," calling the Senator "irresponsible"
for approving the bill and threatening to get the President to veto
it.73 Appeals Court Judge Ruggero Aldisert, Chairman of the
Bankruptcy Committee of the Judicial Conference, defended the
Chief Justice, arguing that he was merely fulfilling his statutory
duty to report the adverse recommendations of the Judicial Conference.74 Even assuming that the Chief Justice was carrying out
the will of the Judicial Conference, its position could readily have
been communicated with far less direct personal involvement of
the Chief Justice and consequent loss of prestige to the Court. 75
Such activities have led a popular network television news
program to air a report about the Chief Justice, investigating his
off-the-bench activities.76 In October 1980 Congressional Quarterly ran an article debating the wisdom of lobbying by federal
judges and especially Chief Justice Burger. 77 And the New York
Times admonished that the duties of Chief Justice and lobbyist
"sit uneasily in the same chair . . . ; the need for prudence should
be evident." 7s Thus, it appears that it is news when a Supreme
Court Justice engages in lobbying, and resultant media coverage is
potentially damaging to the perceived neutrality of the Court.
Which legislative topics are out of bounds for judges? Chief
Justice Burger has stated that he would not comment on any subject other than those relating to his "responsibilities for the admin71. Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1972, p. AI, col. 7; AIO, col. I.
72. Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1978. p. Cll, col. 5.
73. Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1978, p. Cl, col. 3.
74. Aldisert, The Judicial Conference and the New Bankruptcr Act, 65 A.B.A. J. 229.
299 ( 1979).
75. See Kirp, The Justices Might Find a Gag's In Order, Wall St. J .. March 23, 1983.
p. 30, col. 3.
76. CBS Television's "60 Minutes," March 25, 1979.
77. When Federal Judges Lobby, Congressmen Usual(r Listen, 38 Co>;GRESS!ONAL
QUARTERLY 3167 (1980).
78. N.Y. Times, Dec. I, 1978, p. A26, col. 2.
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istration of justice."79 Professor Bickel said that he would like the
Court to comment only on jurisdictional statutes, because they are
"highly technical" and, without judicial advice about them, legislatures would operate nearly blindly.so
Limiting comments to legislation affecting the administration
of justice has a neutral and self-defining ring, but its parameters
are quite amorphous. The Chief Justice has regularly expressed
his dislike of proposals which would have created additional work
for the federal courts. Yet in a recent interview, when asked about
a bill to prevent federal courts from proceeding in controversial
areas such as busing and school prayer, he declined to offer an
opinion, replying "[t]hat is a subject I will have to leave to
others."st The point is not that the Chief Justice was wrong to
refuse to express his views in that instance, or that he should not
have commented on other bills dealing with access to the federal
courts. Rather, the two examples demonstrate that in some sense
all these bills relate to "the administration of justice." Because the
term is so potentially broad, it is an uncertain standard by which
to decide which legislation is appropriate for judicial comment.
Some topics are obviously too political, but the difficult question
is, where should the line be drawn and who should draw it? One
answer, of course, is to stay out of the legislative arena entirely.
At most, the judiciary should answer legislative requests for its
views, keeping replies as technical and objective as possible.
Whenever the Chief Justice ventures beyond his judicial role,
the possibility of creating an appearance of impropriety exists.
One such opportunity is provided in the numerous appointments
that he makes to committees of the Judicial Conference. Students
of the Conference have recognized that these committee assignments, though often arduous and always unremunerated, are coveted by judges because they are one of the few means of status
differentiation within the judiciary.s2 The assignment power enables a Chief Justice to reward friends and allies. Consider this
letter from Chief Justice Taft to a retired district judge, discussing
legislation that would give the Chief more power regarding the
assignment of judges to other locations: "[l]t may be that you and
79. Why Courts Are In Trouble. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 31. 1975, pp.
29-30.
80. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 150. See also id at 138-39 (noting that the Judiciary Acts of 1915 and 1916, amending the Court's appellate jurisdiction, were drafted by
Justices VanDevanter and McReynolds).
81. Unclogging the Courts-Chief Justice Speaks Our, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT.
February 22, 1982, pp. 36. 38.
82. P. FISH, supra note 7, at 273.
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I can agree occasionally on your hearing cases in one of the
Southern Districts in the winter time when the beauties of living
in Maine are a matter of retrospect or prospect. "s3 Such a tiny
reward is unlikely to destroy the judiciary's moral fiber, but one
wonders whether the Chief Justice should be a part of this sort of
petty patronage system.
Consider also the role of Chief Justice Burger in the formation of the Supreme Court Historical Society, whose purpose is to
promote the presentation of the history of the Court. Unlike the
National Geographic Society, on whose board he also serves, the
Chief Justice has not had to disqualify himself from any cases involving the Historical Society. Still, his participation has raised
questions about his role in the Society's fund raising, which involves soliciting money from lawyers who appear before the
Court and from litigants whose cases may be there.s 4 Some observers believe that he unnecessarily damages the prestige of the
Court by serving on the Society's board with, for example, Robert
Stevens, the retired head of a textile firm that is frequently involved in extremely bitter litigation, some of which reaches the
Court. The situation is further clouded by Stevens's additional
gift of $8,500, beyond his $5,000 lifetime membership in the Society, which was used to commission a portrait of the Chief Justice
for the National Portrait Gallery.ss Although these kinds of activities may produce only a faint whiff of impropriety, even that minimal damage is an excessive price to pay for the Chiefs
participation.
Even the Chief Justice's role as chancellor of the Smithsonian
Institution causes problems that may reflect on the Court and may
cause him to have to recuse himself in a tax case involving the
valuation of gems given to that Institution. A recent newspaper
story reported that the Internal Revenue Service has cracked
down on what the Service alleges are "sham" valuations of gifts to
the Smithsonian for which the donors deducted five times the
amount they paid for them. The Chief Justice is involved because
he and the Smithsonian's Secretary hosted a black tie dinner honoring two of the four donors, a fact that appeared in the third
paragraph of the article. Although there is not even a hint of
wrongdoing on the part of Chief Justice Burger, the incident cannot have helped his image or the Court's and, if the tax case goes
83. /d at 34.
84. Wash. Star, Nov. I, 1977, p. AI, rot. 4.
85. !d at col. 2.
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to the Supreme Court, it will at least cause some concern over
whether the Chief Justice can hear it.
Even as seemingly innocuous a task as "building manage."
has produced unwanted litigation and publicity. Two individuals
carrying signs (one of which merely recited the first amendment)
on a sidewalk outside the Court were threatened with arrest because a federal statute made such conduct on the Court's grounds
illegal.s6 They brought suit under the first amendment against the
Supreme Court marshal, who is responsible for supervising the
building under the direction of the entire Court, and Chief Justice
Burger, who has the statutory duty of approving regulations governing the security and decorum of the Court's property.s 7 Eventually, the case went to the Court, but despite his status as a
named defendant the Chief Justice did not recuse himself. The
fact that eventually the Court unanimously upheld the challengess
did not prevent a columnist from highlighting the arguable conflict of interest in banner headlines in Sunday papers around the
country: "Suing Burger in the Burger Court."s9 While some
might lift an eyebrow whenever the Justices are called upon to
decide a case involving protests on the Court's grounds, the problem would surely have been diminished if Congress had not made
the Chief Justice responsible for the regulations, but instead had
assigned the job to the General Services Administration, which
manages most federal property, so that it rather than he had been
named as a defendant.
A recent series of events offers further evidence that the
problems created by the multiple roles of the Chief Justice are not
merely theoretical. On June 28, 1982, the Supreme Court declared that the provisions of the bankruptcy law which allowed
bankruptcy judges, who were not appointed for life, to decide certain kinds of cases, were unconstitutional. The Chief Justice cast
one of three dissenting votes.90 Recognizing that the entire bankruptcy system could be seriously disrupted, the Justices agreed to
suspend the effect of their ruling until October 4, 1982, to enable
Congress to remedy the matter.
At that point, exit the Chief Justice as adjudicator, and enter
the Chief Justice as lobbyist and administrator. One solution to
this problem would be to make all bankruptcy judges lifetime federal judges. The Judicial Conference apparently saw the addition
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

40 U.S.C. § 13k (1976).
40 u.s.c. § 131 (1976).
United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983).
Anderson, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1982, p. B7, col. I.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
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of 227 bankruptcy judges as a diminution of the prestige of the
current district judges and spoke out against it.91 At one point the
Chief Justice even considered appearing on television to express
his opposition to the proposal.92
Meanwhile, as the October 4 deadline approached, it became
apparent that Congress was unlikely to act. In early September
the Conference, charged by Congress with overall responsibility
for the smooth operation of the federal courts, decided to do
something if Congress did not act.93 With no opportunity for
public comment, it issued rules, which it recommended to all federal courts, on how to handle the problem if Congress continued
to procrastinate.
Whether because of doubts about the rules' legality or for
some other reason, the Justice Department asked the Court to give
Congress more time-until December 24, 1982, when the lameduck session was expected to be over. The Court agreed, and the
problem was avoided for another two and a half months. But
once again Congress could not agree on a solution, once again the
Conference's interim solution was sent out, and once again the
Department of Justice asked for more time. This time the Court,
with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, said no. That left the
federal courts with only the interim rules suggested by the Conference, with the Chief Justice's blessing.
It is unclear whether the interim rules are valid. Even if Congress eventually acts, the saga is not likely to end since some of
those who lost cases under the interim rules will seek reversals on
the ground that the Conference had no authority to issue them.
If such a case goes to the Court, the Chief Justice will be hard
put to maintain a semblance of judicial detachment. Indeed, he is
not likely to be the only one with a predilection on the issue. He
may well have talked to his colleagues when the second request
for more time was denied in December and told them that doom
would not truly result from the denial of the stay because the Judicial Conference rules would prevent chaos. Hence anyone challenging the rules could hardly be accused of being cynical if he
felt that the judicial deck was stacked against him.9 4
91. 1982 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 68-69
(1982).
92. N.Y. Times, December 12, 1982, p. 45, col. I.
93. This chronology is set forth in H.R. REP. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1983),
which accompanies H.R. 3, The Bankruptcy Coun Act of 1983. H.R. 3 would resolve the
problem by giving anicle III status to all bankruptcy judges.
.
94. See Lempen. Judges Run Into Ethical Problems in Lobbying Fight, Legal Tunes of
Wash., April 4. 1983, p. II, col. I.
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The point is not that anyone did anything wrong or assumed
roles not specifically authorized by Congress in trying to cope with
this genuine problem. The difficulty arose because Congress had
assigned nonjudicial functions to the Chief Justice which are
plainly inconsistent with his judicial role.
IV.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

No single additional duty of the Chief Justice takes enough
time away from deciding cases so that it can be described as interfering with his judicial responsibilities. Nor will any single foray
into the rule-making or legislative arena destroy the impartial image of the Court. But cumulatively the accretion of duties in the
office of the Chief Justice is an alarming phenomenon.
The first remedy should be a moratorium on new duties for
the Court or the Chief Justice. A recent proposal illustrates just
how urgently we need this moratorium. However painful it may
be for members of Congress to set their own salaries and decide
how much of their expenses of living in Washington should be
deductible on their federal tax returns, it surely turns the notion of
separation of powers upside down to propose, as did the Senate
majority and assistant majority leaders, that the job be turned
over to the Supreme Court.95 Unless Congress stops looking to
the Court to solve every difficult problem, the rest of the effort to
reduce the power of the Chief Justice will almost certainly fail.
We also should recognize that all of the Chief Justice's added
duties do not cause equally severe problems of time commitment,
political influence, and apparent prejudice. Unfortunately, the
easier solutions don't often match the more serious problems. For
instance, a retired Justice could replace the Chief on the boards of
various institutes and societies, but this would have scarcely any
effect on the Chiefs work week or on his influence over important
policy matters. The Chief Justice also could abandon his role as
ultimate supervisor of the Court's print shop, physical plant and
support staff, with no great loss to the Court, but also no great
gain.
Finding a replacement for the Chief Justice as the head of the
federal judiciary is much harder, partly because the position has
so many components. One idea, proceeding from the opposite direction, is to reduce the Court's work load, perhaps by establishing a new court to handle some of the cases that now go to the
95.

S.J. Res. 164, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S2022-23 (1982) (daily ed.).

78

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 1:57

Supreme Court.96 Even if there were sufficient support for such a
change, it would address only one aspect of the problem of nonjudicial activities.
Developing an earlier suggestion of Chief Justice Burger,
Professor Daniel Meado£97 urged that the administrative functions of overseeing the work of the committees of the Judicial
Conference, supervising the Administrative Office, and heading
the Federal Judicial Center be assigned to a newly created post
called "Chancellor of the United States Courts."9s Creating that
job, which might well be filled by a sitting federal judge who
would assume the duties on a full-time, but temporary basis,
would relieve the Chief Justice of most of his administrative duties pertaining to the federal judicial system. As Meador recognizes, the basic idea has several possible variants, each with its
own advantages and disadvantages, but with none likely to replace all of the Chief Justice's obligations. Yet the concept deserves further study.
If one of our concerns is the amount of power possessed by
Chief Justices, then one way to attack the problem would be to
limit the time that any person may serve as Chief Justice. The
Constitution gives all federal judges life tenure; it does not require
that the Justice who is also designated as Chief must remain in
that position as long as he or she remains on the Court. Since
1958, the chief judges of the district and circuit courts have been
required to step down at the age of seventy, although they may
remain active judges.99 In 1982 Congress further reduced the period that any person may serve as chief judge to seven years or the
age of seventy, whichever comes first.wo The same approach
makes even more sense for the Chief Justice of the United States.
Not only does he have more nonjudicial duties than do most
lower court judges, but his influence is far greater than the leader
of any circuit or district court. A fixed term, whether determined
by age or years of service in the job, would militate against the
96. While not yet ready to take a position on the means by which the Supreme
Coun's work load should be reduced permanently, Chief Justice Burger endorsed as an
interim measure, to last for five years, a temporary panel consisting of couns of appeals
judges, which would resolve intercircuit conflicts. 1983 ABA Speech, supra note 23. at II.
Legislation to achieve that end is now pending in the Senate. S. 645, 98 Cong.. 1st Sess.
§ 604 (1983).
97. Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REv. 1031
(1979).
98. Jd at 1049-53.
99. Pub. L. No. 85-593, §§ I, 2, 72 Stat. 497 ((codified at 28 U.S.C. § 45 (1976)).
100. Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 201, 202, 96 Stat. 52 ((codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(3).
136(a)(3} (West Supp. 1983)}.
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possibility that any Chief Justice would wield too much power or
become out of touch with the political mood of the country. And
to the extent that nonjudicial obligations drain the Chiefs energy,
relieving him of his special duties as Chief will help in the later
years when even the most vigorous tend to slow down.
In the meantime, we need to acknowledge that the job of being Chief Justice is not simply that of the highest judge in the
land. It seems unlikely that any Chief Justice could greatly reduce
his nonjudicial activities merely by eliminating the relatively few
tasks that Congress has not imposed. It should be apparent that
the position calls not only for a superior lawyer, but also an able
administrator, an extraordinarily energetic individual with a
broad view of our system of justice and a commitment to exercise
the powers of the office in an even-handed manner.
The full scope of the Chief Justice's duties is of more than
academic concern, since Chief Justice Burger has recently celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday. When the search for his successor is undertaken, it should be done with a greater appreciation
than in the past of the power and scope of the Chief Justice's duties. For if the search is not premised on an accurate assessment
of the position, we will never find a person who can perform its
functions adequately. If our Chief Justices are going to do much
more than decide cases, we need to be sure that they are qualified
for their whole job.

